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1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED WHEN PROSECUTED FOR A 
VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-53 DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN 
RENUMBERED TO U.C.A. § 41-6a-703 6 
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS 13 
III. THE APPELLEE DID NOT ENGAGE IN UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR 16 
CONCLUSION 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 18 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES: 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) 9 
STATE CASES: 
State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (1988) 12 
State v. Cloud 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) 12 
State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) 9 
State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 195 (Utah 1995) 14 
State v. Hutchison 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982) 9 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 1, 9, 10, 11, 12 
State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) 13 
State v. Nichols, 76 P.3d 1173, 1182 (Utah 2003) 12 
State v. Pena, 552 N.Y.S.2d 543, N.Y.City Crim Ct.,1990 13 
State v. Valarde 734 P.2d 440 (1986) 9 
State v. Verde 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 12 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53 5, 6,7, 8, 13, 14, 14, 16, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-712 12 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-701 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 
iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 9 
IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was it reversible error for the appellant to be prosecuted and convicted for a 
violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-53 when that section of the code had been renumbered to 
U.C.A. § 41-6A-701, despite the fact that the language of the newly renumbered statute 
was virtually identical to the old section? 
"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine the confidence of the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-53 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-701 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 28, 2005, a semi-truck, that was exiting westbound, making a right hand 
turn to go north, got stuck on a landscaping boulder as it was leaving the WalMart 
parking lot in Orem, Utah. The truck and trailer completely blocked northbound traffic. 
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The trailer was lodged on the rock and the front axle was lodged on the raised median in 
the center of Sandhill Road. R. At 0018. Tr. at 6, 8. Officer Snyder, the first officer to 
arrive on the scene, observed several northbound vehicles traveling around the semi in the 
southbound lane and drive up and over the raised median to get back into the northbound 
lane. R. at 0018. Tr. at 8. He felt this was unsafe so he parked his car, blocking traffic, 
got out and proceeded to direct traffic into the WalMart and Home Base parking lots. R. 
at 0018 Tr. at 8. Officer Snyder also set up five cones to assist in diverting traffic. 
Officer Watson and Sergeant Nielson arrived and positioned their police cars in an 
attempt to divert traffic. Between the officers, the cones and the police vehicles, officers 
were attempting to direct traffic to go through the parking lot to the next exit "on the 
north side of McDonald's, between McDonald's and Subway, or we were directing traffic 
to go, to go south on Sandhill through the, the old ... Home Base parking lot to come out 
of the, the village, I think its village something, apartments or something." R. at 0018 Tr. 
at 8 -10. 
The raised median continued from under the axle of the truck, north to the 
intersection of University Parkway. Once the raised median began, a vehicle traveling 
north in the southbound lane would never be able to pull into the northbound lane without 
traveling over the raised median. R. at 0018 Tr. at 17. 
Southbound traffic was heavy at the time, as was the rain. R. at 0018 Tr. at 8, 11. 
Southbound traffic was forced to narrow to one lane to get by the accident. R. at 0018 Tr. 
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at 11. Southbound traffic was backing up, with some cars traveling west, through the 
"Home Depot" [Home Base] parking lot. R. at 0018 Tr. at 11. Northbound traffic was 
also heavy. R. at 0030. Appellant supplemented the appellate record with a video tape 
taken by a WalMart security camera. R. at 0028, 0029. The video tape focuses on the 
parking lot. In the upper right hand corner, the tape shows the semi getting stuck and 
blocking traffic. The tape confirms that traffic was heavy for both north and south bound 
lanes. Prior to officers arrival, the tape shows dozens of vehicles turning east into the 
WalMart parking lot, west into the Home Base parking lot or turning around and heading 
south. R. at 0030. The tape is of poor quality and it is difficult to ascertain exactly when 
the officers arrive and where they place their cars. After several minutes, the semi is no 
longer in the picture frame. R. at 0030. 
Officer Snyder conceded that based on his drawing in court - the placement of his 
car and the cones, it may have appeared that traffic was being directed into the 
southbound lane of travel. R. at 0018 Tr. at 21. However, he did not recall where Officer 
Watson's or Sergeant Nielsen's cars were located and had he been able to remember, it 
may have changed the perception of the drawing. R. at 0018 Tr. at 22, 29. What the intent 
of the officers that day was to direct traffic into the two parking lots to the west or east of 
the semi. R. at 0018 Tr. at 21. The tape shows that virtually dozens and dozens, if not 
hundreds of vehicles turned into either parking lot or turned around and headed 
southbound. R. at 0030. 
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Officer Snyder's attention was drawn to appellant's car after he heard Officer 
Watson and Sergeant Nielson yelling. R. at 0018 Tr. at 20. Officer Watson yelled to 
Officer Snyder to stop the appellant's car. R. at 0018 Tr. at 32. Officer Snyder observed 
the appellant's Nissan Altima traveling north in the southbound lane of travel, west of the 
raised median. R. at 0018 Tr. at 20, 40. Southbound travel was heavy and it "appeared 
like, like he would have to weave in and out of the traffic to get, to go more." R. at 0018 
Tr. at 22. 
Officer Snyder was able to stop the appellant's car and identified the appellant by 
his driver's license. R. at 0018 Tr. at 22-23. Officer Snyder admitted to being frustrated 
with the appellant, due to the rain, the traffic situation and the fact that officers had tried 
their best to direct traffic into the parking lots. R. at 0018 Tr. at 20, 21, 25. 
Appellant was issued a citation for a moving violation. The officer wrote on the 
face of the citation "Fail to stop at Police road block 41-6a-904(l)(a)." R. at 0000. 
Officer Snyder had an old code reference book that did not have specific language of the 
traffic statutes. R. at 0018 Tr. at 24. He made the best educated guess as to what the 
appropriate citation would be based on his limited information. R. at 0018 Tr. at 24. 
At appellant's trial on May 18, 2005, the City amended the charge to Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-53 (as amended, 1953), Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway -
Exceptions. The trial court judge amended the face of the citation. R. at 0000. Tr. at 3. 
Appellant was found guilty at trial. R. at 0008. 
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On February 2, 2005, Senate Bill 5 took effect which caused Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-53 (1953, as amended) to be renumbered to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-701 (1953, as 
amended.). Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway - Exceptions. 
Appellant filed a timely appeal. R. 0009. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellee acknowledges that it made an error in prosecuting appellant for a 
violation of U.C.A § 41-6-53 instead of the newly numbered U.C.A. § 41-6a-701, the 
code section that was in effect at the time appellant received his citation. However, this 
error was made in good faith. Not only did the prosecutor erroneously assume the new 
statute had not gone into effect, but the trial court was mistaken as well. Despite the 
mistake in prosecuting appellant under the old statute number, the elements and defenses 
of the newly numbered section remained the same, albeit some of the language had been 
moved within the body of the statute. Appellant was able to present all his evidence and 
make his arguments. The judge listened to both the prosecution and defense. He reached 
his decision based on all the evidence presented. Because it is unlikely that a different 
outcome would have been reached had appellant been prosecuted for a violation of 
U.C.A. 41-6a-701 instead of U.C.A. 41-6-53, a reversal is not warranted. For an error to 
require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine the court's confidence in the decision of the trial court. Appellant cannot meet 
that burden. Therefore, his conviction should be affirmed. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
1. APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED WHEN PROSECUTED FOR A 
VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-53 DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT HAD 
BEEN RENUMBERED TO U.C.A. § 41-6a-703. 
The appellee concedes that it made a mistake when amending the citation to reflect 
a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-53. On the date of the trial, the code section in affect was 
U.C.A. § 41-6a-703. The renumbering of the traffic section went into effect on February 
2, 2005. However, the prosecutor, in good faith, mistakenly believed that it did not go 
into effect until later in the spring, despite Mr. Brown's assertions otherwise. R. at 0018. 
Tr. at 4. The trial court judge also assumed that the renumbering did not take effect until 
later in the spring, after the date of appellant's citation. R. at 0018. Tr. at 4. The 
appellant contends that he was prejudiced by this mistake. The appellee challenges this 
argument. 
During its period of enforcement, U.C.A. § 41-6-53 read as follows: 
Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway - Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the right 
half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same 
direction under the rules governing this movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right of way to all vehicles 
travleing in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway 
within a distance constituting an immediate hazard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
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(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than normal speed of traffic shall 
be operated in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to 
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
or when; 
(b) preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or 
driveway. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-701 reads: 
Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway- Exceptions 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a person operating a vehicle shall operate 
the vehicle on the right half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same 
direction under the rules governing this movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway subject to the provisions of Subsection (2); 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(2) A person operating a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle; 
(a) travleing in the proper direction on a roadway; and 
(b) that is within a distance constituting an immediate hazard. 
(3) A person operating a vehicle on a roadway at less than normal speed of traffic 
under the existing conditions shall operate the vehicle in the right-hand lane then 
available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway, except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction; 
or 
(b) preparing to turn left; or 
(c) taking a different highway or an exit on the left. 
To assist the court in comparing the old and new versions, the underline/strikeout 
as presented on the legislative website is here presented, with the underline/italic sections 
representing the newly added language and the strikeout the deleted language: 
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[41-6-53] 41-6a-701 Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway - Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a person operating a vehicle shall [be 
operated upon] operate the vehicle on the right half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same 
direction under the rules governing this movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway [, but the operator shall yield the right of way to all vehicles 
travleing in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway 
within a distance constituting an immediate hazard subject to the provisions of 
Subsection (2)\ 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
[(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding] (2) A person operating a vehicle shall 
yeild the right-of-way to a vehicle: 
(a) traveling in the proper direction on a roadway; and 
(b) that is within a distance consituting an immediate hazard. 
(3) A person operating a vehicle on a roadway at less than normal speed of traffic 
[under the existing conditions] shall [be operated] operate the vehicle in the right-hand 
lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of 
the roadway, except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
[or when]; 
(b) preparing [ftrra] to turn left [turn at an intersection or into a private road 
or driveway], or 
(c) taking a different highway or an exit on the left. 
When the two statutes are compared, the language of U.C.A. § 41-6a-701 is almost 
identical to its predecessor, U.C.A. § 41-6-53. The major difference is that the exceptions 
of paragraph (b) of U.C.A. 41-6-53 have been moved and broken up into sub-paragraphs 
and placed in paragraph (2) of U.C.A. 41-6a-701. Despite this change in location of the 
language, both statutes still prohibit and allow the exact same behavior. 
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The prosecution of appellant and presentation of the evidence of this case would 
be identical under either version of the statute. The defenses available to the defendant 
are identical under either version of the statute. 
As previously admitted, the appellee made a mistake as to which version of the 
statute it prosecuted. Rule 30 of the Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure states, "Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30. It is the appellee's argument that the 
mistake made in this case did not "affect the substantial right" of the appellant and should 
be disregarded. 
In State v. Knight, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the definition of "affect the 
substantial rights of a party." Prior to 1987, Utah appellate courts had ruled that an error 
warranted reversal "only if a review of the record persuades the court that without the 
error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant" Id. 
At 919. (Quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), (quoting State v. 
Hutchison 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added); see also State v. Valarde 
734 P.2d 440 (1986). "We think the 'reasonable likelihood5 standard set forth in 
Fontana, Hutchison,...[ and in] Velarde best explains Rule 30fs test for reversible error." 
Knight at 919. The court went on to state that due to inconsistent standards in the past, it 
would take the opportunity to "flesh out the meaning" of the phrase "reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result." Id. 
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The Knight court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance. In defining a 
similarly worded standard, the Supreme Court stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), "'A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Knight at 920. While the 
Supreme Courts interpretation of "reasonable probability" is not binding on Utah courts, 
the Utah Supreme Court was persuaded that this definition was substantively identical to 
"reasonable likelihood" in determining when reversible error has occurred Id. "Rules 
that govern criminal proceedings are meant to ensure that a trial is a search for truth and 
that the verdict merits confidence. It is entirely consistent with this aim to require that 
when error has eroded a reviewing court's confidence in the outcome of a particular trial, 
we should start over and conduct a new trial." Id. 
In this case, all of the facts came out. The appellant was able to present all of his 
facts as well as present his defense of being allegedly directed into the left hand travel 
lane. The appellee, in his direct of Officer Snyder, even raised the issue of a possible 
defense. "...I'll play devils advocate with you for a minute. It looks like you were 
directing traffic into the southbound land..." R. 0018. Tr. At 21. Officer Snyder agreed, 
that based on his diagram of where he placed his car and cones, it could be interpreted 
that way. However, since he was not sure where the other officers had placed their cars, 
he could not completely agree that it would appear that northbound traffic was being 
directed into the southbound lane. Officer Snyder was very specific in stating that the 
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goal was to direct traffic into either the east or west parking lots. R. 0018. Tr. At 21. 
When reviewing the video tape that appellant placed into the record, it is abundantly clear 
that virtually all other cars understood that they were not being directed into the 
southbound lane of travel, but rather were being directed into the east or west parking 
lots. R. 0030. Finally, appellant states that he was prejudiced by not being able to present 
a defense to the new statute. However, he fails to cites to any specific facts he was 
unable to present or how that evidence would have changed the verdict of the trial. He 
has simply made a broad sweeping statement with nothing to support his argument. 
"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. This is certainly above the 
'mere possibility' point on the spectrum. If it is 'more probable than not' that the 
outcome of trial would have been different, then a court cannot possibly place confidence 
in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome 
may be undermined at some point substantially short of the 'more probable than not' 
portion of the spectrum. It may not be possible to define 'reasonable likelihood' much 
more explicitly than this, but the foregoing should be of some assistance in deciding 
whether an error requires reversal." 
Knight at 920. 
While it was error on the City's part to amend the charge to the old code section, it 
was not an error that meets the Knight requirement for reversal. The likelihood of a 
different outcome is not sufficiently high to undermine the confidence of this verdict. 
Even under the provisions of U.C.A. § 41-6a-701, appellant would not prevail based on 
the facts of this case. He admits to driving on the left-hand side of the roadway. The only 
exception to this rule that would allow defendant to drive in the left hand lane is two-fold. 
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First, he must yield the right of way to south-bound traffic and second, he must yield the 
right of way to vehicles that are within a distance constituting an immediate hazard. 
Had he continued traveling north in the southbound lane of travel, it would have 
been impossible for him to yield the right of way. There was no where for him to pull 
over and yield without committing further moving violations. The raised median 
continued from under the truck all the way to the intersection of Sandhill Road and 
University Parkway. On-coming traffic would have been forced to maneuver around him, 
effectively yielding their right-of-way to the appellant. Officer Snyder confirmed this 
when he stated that to continue northbound, appellant would have had to "weave in and 
out of traffic." R. at 0018. Tr. at 22. 
One way appellant could have yielded the right-of-way to on-coming traffic would 
have been to drive over the raised median and get back into the northbound lane of travel. 
Driving over a median is illegal. U.C.A. § 41-6a-712. The other option would have been 
to drive across all southbound lanes of travel, cutting off southbound traffic, and park on 
the shoulder. This too, is an untenable alternative. 
Because the error in this case did not affect the outcome of the trial, the error 
should be deemed harmless. As such, a reversal is not warranted. State v. Verde 770 
P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989) see e.g. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (1988); Knight at 919-20; 
State v. Cloud 722 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah 1986); State v. Nichols, 76 P.3d 1173, 1182 
(Utah 2003). 
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In searching Utah case law for cases on point, the appellee was unable to find any 
local authority. However, in the State of New York, a trial court faced a similar situation. 
In State v. Pena, 552 N.Y.S.2d 543, N.Y.City Crim Ct.,1990, defendant was tried for 
reckless driving under a New York statute that had been previously renumbered. After 
the state's first witness had testified, the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that 
the accusatory instrument failed to properly charge a crime. The court denied defendant's 
motion and granted the people's motion to amend concluding that the new section was 
unchanged when the new law was enacted. Accordingly, the factual allegations sufficient 
to prove reckless driving under the previously numbered section were the same under the 
new numbering system. Pena at. 544. 
The same can be said of this case. While the numbering and some of the words of 
the U.C.A. § 41-6a-701 have been changed from U.C.A. 41-6-53, the new code section 
prohibits the same actions as well as providing the same defenses. Therefore, appellant 
was not prejudiced and his conviction should be affirmed. 
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS. 
Appellant contends that his due process rights were violated by being treated 
differently than other similarly situated defendants. To support his argument, appellant 
cites to State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), claiming that the traffic code, as applied 
to appellant and other similarly situated defendants was not applied uniformly. 
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In Mohi, defendant, a juvenile, was prosecuted as an adult under the direct-file 
provisions of state code. Under the language of the statute, he could also have been 
charged as a juvenile. The decision whether to charge him as an adult or juvenile was left 
to the prosecutor. In addition to this and other considerations, the fact that the same 
conduct would receive such dissimilar penalties depending on which court defendant was 
prosecuted in led the court to conclude that the law was not uniformly applied. Mohi at 
1004. 
In this case, other than a number, there was no dissimilarity between appellant and 
other similarly situated defendants charged with the same offense. As discussed above, 
the prohibitions, exceptions and defenses did not materially change between the old and 
new numbered statutes. The penalties for violating the old numbered statute versus the 
new numbered statute did not change. 
Due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged 
statute. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 195 (Utah 1995). To obtain a conviction under 
U.C.A. 41-6-53, appellee had to prove that appellant operated his vehicle on the left-hand 
side of the road without a valid exception. The exceptions are: 
(a) "when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
under the rules governing that movement;" 
(b) "when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the center of 
the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the 
proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway within a distance 
constituting an immediate hazard;" 
(c) "on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the applicable 
rules; or" 
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(d) "on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic." 
U.C.A. 41-6-53. 
To obtain a conviction under U.C.A. 41-6a-701, appellee must prove that appellant 
operated his vehicle on the left-hand side of the road without a valid exception. The 
exceptions are: 
(a) "when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
under the rules governing that movement;" 
(b) "when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the center of 
the roadway, subject to the provisions of Subsection (2); 
(c) "on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the applicable 
rules; or" 
(d) "on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic." 
(2) A person operating a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle; 
(a) "traveling in the proper direction on a roadway; and" 
(b) "that is within a distance constituting an immediate hazard. 
U.C.A. 41-6a-701 
There is no difference in the proof that appellee must show. There is no difference 
in the defenses appellant may provide. To say he was prejudiced for being prosecuted 
under the old numbered statute is not supported by the language of the statute itself. 
Due process also requires that a defendant be advised of the charge and provided 
notice. Via e-mail, appellant was notified that appellee would be prosecuting him for a 
violation of U.C.A. 41-6-53. R. At 0018. Tr. At 3. Appellant did not dispute this fact 
that he had been put on notice. Appellee does not dispute that appellant informed 
appellee that the statute had been renumbered but as has been set forth, appellee thought 
that appellant was wrong. Nevertheless, appellant was put on notice of the appellee's 
intent. 
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III. THE APPELLEE DID NOT ENGAGE IN UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR. 
Appellee accuses the appellant of engaging in unethical behavior for prosecuting 
him for a violation of U.C.A. 41-6-53. Appellant states "... Mr. Church had at this point 
already prosecuted numerous offenses under the 6a revision that occurred before 
[emphasis in original] the incident in question here." Appellant's brief at 6. There are no 
facts in the record to support this allegation. Because there are no facts in the record, the 
appellee is forced to speculate as to what appellant is referring to. 
Since appellant would only have access to the court's public filings, the 
assumption is that is where he obtained his information. When the change in the traffic 
code numbering system went into effect, it is likely that the state court computer system 
was updated to reflect these changes1. The prosecutor would have had no participation in 
making these changes nor was he aware that any change in the court's computer system 
had been made. Once a change to the state court computer system was made, Mr. 
Church's name would be automatically attached to cases he prosecuted per the court's 
computer system. 
It makes no sense for a prosecutor to create this type of appealable problem for 
himself, especially if he consciously knew that the code had been renumbered. When the 
prosecutor amended the code section in open court, he honestly believed that was the 
1
 Despite Mr. Church's amending the charge to the old number and the judge 
granting the motion, when defendant's conviction is researched on the state court 
computer system, it appears as a conviction for violating U.C.A. § 41-6a-701. 
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section that was in effect at the time the appellant committed the offense. R. At 0018. 
Tr. At 4. Further, the trial court judge also assumed that the renumbering did not take 
effect until later in the spring, after the date of appellant's citation. R. at 0018. Tr. at 4. 
Therefore, to imply that the prosecutor consciously knew that he had prosecuted other 
defendants under the renumbered system but intentionally treated appellant differently is 
without merit or proof. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the honest error of the appellee, appellant was not prejudiced when the 
trial court judge found him guilty. The language of U.C.A. 41-6a-701 is virtually 
identical to that of its predecessor, U.C.A 41-6-53. The newly renumbered section 
prohibits the same actions and provides the same defenses. A trial is a search for truth. 
The truth was presented at trial, both through the appellant's and appellee's witnesses. 
While the error of prosecuting appellant under an old code section may cause this Court 
some pause, it is not the type of error that requires reversal. For an error to be reversible, 
the likelihood of a different outcome at the trial level must be sufficiently high to 
seriously undermine the confidence in the trial court verdict. That is not the case here. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm appellant's conviction. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of March, 2006. 
ROBERTXCHURCH 
Orem City Prosecutor 
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Pro Se Appellant 
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